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I present a variety of results on the theory of quantum
secret sharing. I show that any mixed state quantum secret
sharing scheme can be derived by discarding a share from
a pure state scheme, and that the size of each share in a
quantum secret sharing scheme must be at least as large as
the size of the secret. I show that the only constraints on
the existence of quantum secret sharing schemes with general
access structures are monotonicity (if a set is authorized, so
are larger sets) and the no-cloning theorem. I also discuss
some aspects of sharing classical secrets using quantum states.
In this situation, the size of each share can sometimes be half
the size of the classical secret.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a classical secret sharing scheme, some sensitive clas-
sical data is distributed among a number of people such
that certain sufficiently large sets of people can access
the data, but smaller sets can gain no information about
the shared secret. For instance, a possible application is
to share the key for a joint checking account shared by
many people. No individual is able to withdraw money,
but sufficiently large groups can use the account.
One particularly symmetric variety of secret sharing
scheme is called a threshold scheme. A (k, n) classical
threshold scheme has n shares, of which any k are suffi-
cient to reconstruct the secret, while any set of k − 1
or fewer shares has no information about the secret.
Blakely [1] and Shamir [2] showed that threshold schemes
exist for all values of k and n with n ≥ k.
It is also possible to consider more general secret shar-
ing schemes which have an asymmetry between the power
of the different shares. For instance, one might consider
a scheme with four shares A, B, C, and D. Any set
containing A, B, and C or A and D can reconstruct
the secret, but any other set of shares has no informa-
tion. In this example, the presence of A is essential to
reconstructing the secret, but not sufficient — A needs
the help of either D or both B and C. This particular
scheme can be constructed by taking a (5, 7) threshold
scheme, and assigning 3 shares to A, 2 to D, and 1 to
each of B and C, but other schemes exist which cannot
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be constructed by bundling together shares of a threshold
scheme. The list of which sets are able to reconstruct the
secret is called an access structure for the secret sharing
scheme. It turns out that a secret sharing scheme exists
for any access structure, provided it is monotone [3] —
i.e., that if a set S can reconstruct the secret, so can all
sets containing S.
With the advent of quantum computation, it is possible
that quantum information may someday be as common-
place as classical information, and we may wish to protect
it the same ways as we protect classical information. Us-
ing quantum secret sharing [4], we could perhaps create
joint checking accounts containing quantum money [5],
or share hard-to-create ancilla states [6], or perform a se-
cure distributed quantum computation. [4] showed some
basic results about quantum secret sharing schemes, in-
cluding the existence of quantum threshold schemes. A
quantum ((k, n)) threshold scheme (the use of double
parentheses distinguishes it from a classical scheme) ex-
ists provided the no-cloning theorem is satisfied — i.e.,
n/2 < k ≤ n. In this paper, I will prove some further re-
sults about quantum secret sharing schemes with general
access structures, including the fact that the no-cloning
theorem and monotonicity provide the only restriction
on the existence of quantum secret sharing schemes.
Another possible application of quantum states to se-
cret sharing is to create secret sharing schemes sharing
classical data using quantum states [7,8]. This could
allow, for instance, for more secure distribution of the
shares of the scheme. I will show below that it can also
produce more efficient schemes: in any purely classical
scheme, the size of each important share must be at least
as large as the size of the secret, whereas using quantum
states to share a classical secret, we can sometimes make
each share half the size of the secret.
In the theory of classical secret sharing, one sometimes
considers schemes which do not completely hide the se-
cret from unauthorized groups of people, or from which
the secret cannot be perfectly reconstructed even by au-
thorized sets. I will not consider the quantum general-
izations of such schemes. I will only consider the theory
of perfect secret sharing schemes, in which the data is
either completely revealed or completely hidden, with no
middle ground.
1
II. QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
I will begin by reviewing some results from [4] which
will form the basis of much of the later discussion. In a
perfect quantum secret sharing scheme, any set of shares
is either an authorized set, in which case someone hold-
ing all of those shares can exactly reconstruct the origi-
nal secret, or an unauthorized set, in which case someone
holding just those shares can acquire no information at
all about the secret quantum state (that is, the density
matrix of an unauthorized set is the same for all encoded
states). For a generic state split up into a number of
shares, most sets will be neither authorized nor unautho-
rized — quantum secret sharing schemes form a special
set of states.
One constraint on quantum secret sharing schemes is
an obvious one inherited from classical schemes. Any
secret sharing scheme must be monotonic. That is, if we
increase the size of a set, it cannot switch from authorized
to unauthorized (the indicator function which is 0 for
unauthorized sets and 1 for authorized sets is monotonic).
As we shall see in section III, the only other con-
straint on quantum secret sharing schemes is the no-
cloning theorem [9,10]. We cannot make two copies of
an unknown quantum state. Therefore, we cannot dis-
tribute the shares of quantum secret sharing scheme into
two disjoint authorized sets (each of which could produce
a copy of the original state). Since every set is either au-
thorized or unauthorized, this implies the complement of
an authorized set is always an unauthorized set.
A pure state quantum secret sharing scheme encodes
pure state secrets as pure states (when all of the shares
are available). A mixed state quantum secret sharing
scheme may encode some or all pure states of the secret
as mixed states. Pure state schemes have some special
properties, as a consequence of the following theorem,
but the general quantum secret sharing scheme is a mixed
state scheme.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 first appeared in [4].
Theorem 1 Let C be a subspace of a Hilbert space H
which can be written as tensor product of the Hilbert
spaces of various coordinates. Then C corrects erasure
errors1 on a set K of coordinates iff
〈φ|E|φ〉 = c(E) (1)
(independent of |φ〉 ∈ C) for all operators E acting on K.
A pure state encoding of a quantum secret is a quantum
1An erasure error is a general error on a known coordinate.
For instance, it replaces the coordinate with a state |e〉 or-
thogonal to the regular Hilbert space. Recall that a quantum
error-correcting code of distance d can correct d − 1 erasure
errors or ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ general errors.
secret sharing scheme iff the encoded space corrects era-
sure errors on unauthorized sets and it corrects erasure
errors on the complements of authorized sets.
Proof: The first equivalence follows from the theory of
quantum error-correcting codes. To recover the original
secret on an authorized set, we must be able to compen-
sate for the absence of the remaining shares, which is to
say from an erasure error on the complement of the au-
thorized set. The condition (1) implies that measuring
any Hermitian operator on the coordinates K gives us no
information about which state in C we have. This means
the density matrix on K does not depend on the state,
which is precisely the condition we need an unauthorized
set to satisfy. ✷
As a corollary, we find that pure state schemes are only
possible for a highly restricted class of access structures.
Corollary 2 In a pure state quantum secret sharing
scheme, the authorized sets are precisely the complements
of the unauthorized sets.
Proof: By the no-cloning theorem, the complement of
an authorized set is always an unauthorized set. By the-
orem 1, for a pure state scheme, we can correct erasure
errors on any unauthorized set. This means we can re-
construct the secret in the absence of those shares; that
is, the complement is an authorized set. ✷
Suppose we start with an arbitrary quantum access
structure (a set of authorized sets) and add new autho-
rized sets, filling out the result to be monotonic. For
instance, if we started with the access structure ABC or
AD from the introduction (any set containing A, B, and
C is authorized, as is any set containing both A and D),
we could add the set BD (so any set containing B and D
is also now authorized). We wish to continue to satisfy
the no-cloning theorem as well, so we never add a new
authorized set contained in the complement of an exist-
ing authorized set. This ensures that the complement of
every authorized set remains an unauthorized set. For
instance, in the example, we could not have added BC
as an authorized set, since its complement AD is already
authorized.
Initially, there may be unauthorized sets whose com-
plements are also unauthorized, but if we continue adding
authorized sets, we will eventually reach a point where
the authorized and unauthorized sets are always com-
plements of each other, as is required for a pure state
scheme. In the example, we could add CD as an autho-
rized set. Now, the authorized sets are all sets containing
ABC, AD, BD, or CD. At this point, we will have to
stop adding authorized sets — any more would violate
the no-cloning theorem. Thus, an access structure where
the authorized and unauthorized sets are complements of
each other is a maximal quantum access structure.
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Pure state schemes and maximal access structures may
seem like a very special situation, but in fact they play
a central role in the theory of quantum secret sharing
because of the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Every mixed state quantum secret sharing
scheme can be described as a pure state quantum secret
sharing scheme with one share discarded. The access
structure of the pure state scheme is unique.
Proof: Given a superoperator that maps the Hilbert
space S of the secret to density operators on H (which
is a tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the various
shares), we can extend the superoperator to a unitary
map from S toH⊗E for some space E . We assign this ad-
ditional Hilbert space to the extra share. In other words,
we can “purify” the mixed state encoding by adding an
extra share. The original mixed state scheme is produced
by discarding the extra share. I claim that the new pure
state encoding is a quantum secret sharing scheme.
Sets on the original shares remain authorized or unau-
thorized, as they were before adding E . Given a set T
including the extra share, look at the complement of T ,
which is a set not including E and is thus either autho-
rized or unauthorized (in the new scheme as well as the
old). For instance, if we purify the scheme (ABC or
AD) by adding a fifth share E, the complement of CDE
is unauthorized, while the complement of DE is autho-
rized. If the complement is authorized, then we can cor-
rect for erasures on T , and condition (1) holds for T —
we can get no information about the secret from T , and T
is unauthorized. If the complement of T is unauthorized,
we can correct erasures on the complement. Therefore,
we can reconstruct the state with just T , and T is autho-
rized. Thus, the new scheme is secret sharing.
It is clear from the argument that any other purifica-
tion of the mixed state scheme would produce the same
access structure. ✷
In [4], we presented a class of quantum secret sharing
schemes where every share had the same size as the se-
cret. One might wonder if it is possible to do better. For
instance, can we make one share much smaller than the
secret, possibly at the cost of enlarging another share?
The answer is no, provided we only consider important
shares (unimportant shares never make a difference as to
whether a set is authorized or unauthorized).
Theorem 4 The dimension of each important share of a
quantum secret sharing scheme must be at least as large
as the dimension of the secret.
Proof: We need only prove the result for pure state
schemes. By theorem 3, the result for mixed state
schemes will follow.
Let S be an important share in a pure state quantum
secret sharing scheme. Then there is an unauthorized set
T such that T ∪ {S} is authorized. Share the state |0〉
and give the shares of T to Bob and the remaining shares
(including S) to Alice. By corollary 2, Alice’s shares
form an authorized set; she can correct for erasures on
T . By theorem 6 below, this means Alice can perform
any operation she likes on the secret without disturbing
Bob’s shares. She can equally well perform quantum in-
teractions between the secret and other quantum states
held by her. In particular, if Alice has state |ψ〉 from
a Hilbert space of dimension s (the size of the secret),
she can coherently swap it into her shares of the secret
sharing scheme, which now encodes the state |ψ〉. Then
Alice sends just the share S to Bob. Bob now has an
authorized set, so he can reconstruct |ψ〉. Therefore, by
theorem 5 below, share S must have had dimension at
least s as well. ✷
The above proof depends on two theorems of interest
outside the theory of quantum secret sharing. The first is
obvious, and it is also true; it has not, to my knowledge,
appeared before in the literature.
Theorem 5 Even in the presence of preexisting entan-
glement, sending an arbitrary state from a Hilbert space
of dimension s requires a channel of dimension s.
Proof: This proof is due to Michael Nielsen [11].
Assume that in addition to whatever entanglement is
given, Alice and Bob share a cat state
∑ |i〉A|i〉B of di-
mension s. Using a straightforward variant of superdense
coding [12], Alice can encode one of s2 classical states in
this cat state. Now Alice transmits her half of the cat
state to Bob, using the preexisting entanglement if it
helps. Bob can now reconstruct the classical state, so by
the bounds on superdense coding [13], Alice must have
used a channel of dimension s. ✷
The second theorem is more interesting. It says that
if Alice can read a piece of quantum data, she can also
change it any way she likes, without disturbing any en-
tanglement of the encoding with the outside. There will
be no way to tell that the data has been changed.
Theorem 6 Suppose a superoperator S maps a Hilbert
space H to density operators on A⊗B, and S restricted
to A (that is, traced over B) is invertible (by quantum
operation). Then for any unitary U : H → H, there
exists a unitary operation V : A→ A such that V ◦ S =
S ◦ U .
Proof: We can extend the superoperator S to a unitary
operator W and enlarge B with the necessary extra di-
mensions. If V works forW , it will also work for S. Since
W is invertible on A, the image subspace corrects erasure
errors on B, and
〈ψ|E|ψ〉 = c(E) (2)
for any operator E acting on B, where c(E) is indepen-
dent of |ψ〉 ∈ W (H). Choose a basis |j〉B for B. Given
any state |ψ〉 in the image of W , we can write it as
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|ψ〉 =
∑
|ψj〉A|j〉B. (3)
(The states |ψj〉 are not necessarily orthogonal, although
we could have made them orthogonal for any single |ψ〉.)
If we let E be a projection on the basis states of B, or a
projection on the basis states followed by a permutation
of those basis states, (2) implies that the inner products
〈ψi|ψj〉 are independent of |ψ〉. Therefore, there is a uni-
tary operation V acting on A that takes any set of states
|ψj〉A for |ψ〉 ∈ W (H) to the set of states |φj〉A for any
state |φ〉 ∈ W (H). In fact, V will map |ψ〉 to |φ〉.
More generally, and by the same logic, given any two
bases of W (H), there will be a unitary V on A that
takes one to the other. Given U : H → H , we can define
U as mapping a basis |vi〉 to basis |wi〉. Then define
V : A → A as an operator that maps W |vi〉 to W |wi〉,
and the theorem follows. ✷
I conclude this section with an easy theorem that will
be needed in the construction of a general access struc-
ture.
Theorem 7 If S1 and S2 are quantum secret sharing
schemes, then the scheme formed by concatenating them
(expanding each share of S1 as the secret of S2) is also
secret sharing.
The reason this requires proof is that, due to some
nonlocal quantum effect, it might have been possible to
get more information from sets in two copies of S2 than
can be accessed from just one of the sets.
Proof: By theorem 3, we need only consider pure state
schemes. Then the concatenated scheme S is a pure state
scheme too. Suppose we have some set of shares T . We
can write it as the union
⋃
Ti, where Ti is a set on the ith
copy of S2. Consider the set U of copies on which Ti is
authorized. U is either an authorized or an unauthorized
set of S1. If it is authorized, then our big set T is certainly
authorized — we reconstruct the copies of S2 in U , and
use U to reconstruct the original secret.
If U is unauthorized, we look at the complement of
T . It can be written as a union
⋃
T ′i , where T
′
i is the
complement of Ti in its copy of S2. T
′
i is authorized
whenever Ti is unauthorized. Therefore, the set of copies
on which T ′i is authorized is the complement of U , which
is authorized. Thus, the complement of T is authorized,
so T is unauthorized. ✷
Clearly the proof works equally well for more com-
plicated concatenation schemes, with multiple levels or
with a different scheme S2 for each share of S1. Also
note that if we bundle shares together (assigning two or
more shares to the same person), the result is still a secret
sharing scheme.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF A GENERAL ACCESS
STRUCTURE
This section will be devoted to proving that monotonic-
ity and the no-cloning theorem provide the only restric-
tions on the existence of quantum secret sharing schemes.
The same result has been shown by Adam Smith [14] by
adapting a classical construction. The construction given
here is undoubtedly far from optimal in terms of the share
sizes of the resulting schemes.
Theorem 8 A quantum secret sharing scheme exists for
an access structure S iff S is monotone and satisfies the
no-cloning theorem (i.e., the complement of an autho-
rized set is an unauthorized set). For any maximal quan-
tum access structure S, a pure state scheme exists.
It will be helpful to first understand an analogous clas-
sical construction [3]. Any access structure can be writ-
ten in a disjunctive normal form, which is the OR of a
list of authorized sets. For our standard example, with
authorized sets ABC and AD, the normal form is (A
AND B AND C) OR (A AND D). This normal form
provides a construction in terms of threshold schemes —
the AND gate corresponds to a (2, 2) threshold scheme
(which has one authorized set A AND B), while the OR
gate corresponds to a (1, 2) threshold scheme (for which
A OR B is authorized). Then by concatenating the ap-
propriate set of threshold schemes, we get a construction
for the original access structure.
In the quantum case, this construction fails, because
by the no-cloning theorem, there is no ((1, 2)) quantum
threshold scheme. A single authorized set (such as A
AND B AND C) still corresponds to a quantum thresh-
old scheme (a ((3, 3)) scheme in this case), but to take
the OR of these authorized sets, we will have to do some-
thing different. We will replace the ((1, 2)) scheme with
((r, 2r−1)) schemes (which correspond to majority func-
tions instead of OR). r of the shares will be the individual
authorized sets of the desired access structure, and the
other r − 1 shares will be from another access structure
that is easier to construct.
The full construction is recursive. Given constructions
of access structures for n− 1 shares, we will construct all
maximal access structures for n shares. From maximal
access structures on n shares we will be able to construct
all access structures on n shares. We can start from the
base case of 1 share, which just has the trivial ((1, 1))
access structure. The construction will assume we know
how to create threshold schemes, for instance using the
construction in [4].
Given any maximal access structure S on n shares,
consider the access structure S′ obtained by discarding
one share. Certainly S′ is still monotonic and still satis-
fies the no-cloning theorem. Therefore, by the inductive
hypothesis, we have a construction for the access struc-
ture S′. Now, following the proof of theorem 3, add an
additional share to S′ putting it in an overall pure state.
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By the proof of theorem 3, we know the resulting scheme
is in fact a quantum secret sharing scheme. It is not hard
to see that S is the unique access structure produced this
way.
For instance, the maximal access structure ABC OR
AD OR BD OR CD can be formed by purifying the
(mixed state) scheme with access structure ABC (just a
((3, 3)) threshold scheme).
Now suppose we are given a general quantum access
structure S on n shares. We describe this access structure
by a list of its minimal authorized sets A1, A2, . . . , Ar. As
mentioned above, Ai by itself defines a quantum access
structure — a ((k, k)) threshold scheme, in fact, if Ai
contains k shares.
S has a total of r minimal authorized sets. Let us take
a ((r, 2r − 1)) quantum threshold scheme, and expand
each of its shares using another secret sharing scheme.
Share i, for i = 1, . . . , r, is expanded using the threshold
scheme associated with the set Ai. Shares r+ 1 through
2r − 1 will all be expanded using another secret sharing
scheme S′.
S′ will be a pure state scheme, with a maximal access
structure which can be achieved by adding authorized
sets to S. That means when A is an authorized set of S
(so it contains some Ai), it is also an authorized set of
S′. Therefore, we can reconstruct the last r− 1 shares of
the ((r, 2r−1)) scheme, as well as at least one of the first
r shares, so A is an authorized set for the concatenated
scheme.
Conversely, if we have a set B which does not include
any of the sets Ai, we do not have an authorized set
for any of the schemes Ai. B might be an authorized
set for the scheme S′, but that only gives us authorized
sets for at most r − 1 shares of the ((r, 2r − 1)) scheme.
Therefore, B is an unauthorized set. This shows that the
access structure of the concatenated scheme is exactly S,
completing the construction.
As an example, consider this construction applied to
the access structure ABC OR AD. The three rows rep-
resent shares of a ((2, 3)) scheme, so authorized sets on
any two rows suffice to reconstruct the secret. Repeated
letters imply bundling, so A gets a share from each of the
first two rows, as well as one from the third row.
((2, 3)) scheme


((3, 3)) : A, B, C
((2, 2)) : A, D
S′
(4)
The first two rows are threshold schemes. S′ is a maximal
access structure containing {A,B,C} and {A,D}. For
instance, in this case, S′ could be the scheme ABC OR
AD OR BD OR CD which we constructed earlier; or we
could just use the trivial scheme with authorized set {A}
(give A the secret).
I noted in the introduction that this particular scheme
can be easily constructed directly from a ((5, 7)) thresh-
old scheme. However, not all access structures can be
made by bundling together shares of a threshold scheme
(for instance, ABCD OR ADE OR BCD cannot be so
constructed2 — E would have to get more shares of the
threshold scheme than B since ADE is authorized while
ABD is not, but BCD is authorized while CDE is not),
while the recursive construction always works.
IV. SHARING CLASSICAL SECRETS
We can also use quantum states to share classical se-
crets, a process previously considered in [7] and [8]. Many
of the theorems proved above will fail in this situation.
For instance, superdense coding [12] provides an example
of a (2, 2) threshold scheme where each share is a single
qubit, but the secret is two classical bits: the four Bell
states |00〉±|11〉, |01〉±|10〉 encode the four possible 2-bit
numbers, and for all four states, each qubit is completely
random. This (2, 2) scheme is a pure state scheme, yet
does not satisfy corollary 2, and the share size is smaller
than the size of the secret. Neither is possible for a purely
classical scheme or for a purely quantum scheme. An-
other difference is that there is no rule against copying
classical data, so, for instance, (k, n) threshold schemes
are allowed, even with k < n/2.
We can write down conditions for a pure state scheme
of this sort to be secret sharing, along the lines of theo-
rem 1.
Theorem 9 Suppose we have a set of orthonormal states
|ψi〉 encoding a classical secret. Then a set T is an unau-
thorized set iff
〈ψi|F |ψi〉 = c(F ) (5)
(independent of i) for all operators F on T . T is autho-
rized iff
〈ψi|E|ψj〉 = 0 (i 6= j) (6)
for all operators E on the complement of T .
Note that only the basis states |ψi〉 appear in Theo-
rem 9, whereas in Theorem 1, the condition had to hold
for all |ψ〉 in a Hilbert space. This is the source of the
difference between classical and quantum secrets — the
former hides just a set of orthogonal states, while the
latter hides all superpositions of those states.
Proof: On an unauthorized set, we should be able to
acquire no information about which state |ψi〉 we have.
2For quantum access structures, threshold schemes suffice for
fewer than five shares, whereas for classical access structures,
there are examples where they fail for four shares. This is
because the four-share classical examples would violate the
no-cloning theorem.
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This is precisely condition (5). On an authorized set, we
need to be able to correct for the erasure of the qubits
on the complement. This is equivalent to being able to
distinguish the state |ψi〉 from the state |ψj〉 with an
arbitrary operator applied to the complement of T . That
is, it is equivalent to condition (6). ✷
Note that purely classical secret sharing schemes can
be considered as a particular special case of sharing
classical data with quantum states — every encoding
in a purely classical scheme is just a mixture of tensor
products of basis states. Purely classical secret sharing
schemes are always mixed state schemes, since classically,
there is no way to hide information without randomness.
Superdense coding provided an example where using
quantum data allowed a factor of 2 improvement in space
over any classical scheme. It turns out that this is the
best we can do.
Theorem 10 The dimension of each important share of
a classical secret sharing scheme must be at least as large
as the square root of the dimension of the secret. The
total size of each authorized set must be at least as large
as the secret.
This means that a 2n-bit secret requires shares of at
least n qubits.
Proof: The proof is quite similar to the proof of theo-
rem 4, which gives the corresponding result for quantum
secret sharing schemes. We create the quantum state
corresponding to the shared secret 0. If it is a mixed
state scheme, we include any extra qubits needed to pu-
rify it (the result may not be a secret sharing scheme,
however — theorem 3 need not hold). If S is the share
under consideration, and T is an unauthorized set such
that T ∪ {S} is authorized, give T to Bob, and all the
other shares (including S and the extra purifying qubits)
to Alice.
Bob has no information about the secret; 〈ψi|E|ψi〉
is independent of i. Therefore, as in the proof of theo-
rem 6, Alice can perform, without access to Bob’s qubits,
a transformation between |ψ0〉 (the current state) and
|ψi〉 for any i. Then she sends the share S to Bob, who
now has an authorized set, and can reconstruct i. We
have sent a secret of dimension s using prior entangle-
ment and the share S, which by the bounds on super-
dense coding [13] must therefore have dimension at least√
s. Those bounds also show the size of the channel plus
preexisting entanglement must be s, so the size of the full
authorized coalition is at least s. ✷
Note that we used an analogue of theorem 6 in the
proof. The general case of theorem 6 is clearly not true
here: Since the data is classical, we could make two copies
of it. Then one copy is sufficient to read it, but both are
needed to change it without leaving a trace. In fact, the
version of the theorem we have used is just the proof that
perfect quantum bit commitment is impossible [15,16] —
Bob has no information about the state, so Alice can
change the state to whatever she likes.
Besides being an interesting result about secret sharing
schemes, this theorem is useful in analyzing other cryp-
tographic concepts. For instance, it shows that there is
no useful unconditionally secure cryptographic memory
protocol, which can only be unlocked with a key, which
we would want to be much smaller than the stored data.
Such a protocol would be a (2, 2) secret sharing scheme,
so the theorem requires that the key be at least half the
size of the data.
Theorem 10 can be easily modified to show that in
any purely classical scheme, each important share must
be at least dimension s, not
√
s. This follows because if
Alice and Bob are just sending classical states back and
forth, they need a channel of dimension s to send the
secret rather than dimension
√
s. We have already seen
one example where this improvement is achievable using
quantum states.
When else can we get this factor of 2 improvement in
the number of qubits per share? I do not have a full
answer to this question. Certainly for a (1, n) threshold
scheme, no improvement is possible, since each autho-
rized coalition (each single share) must be as large as the
secret. For many other threshold schemes, however, an
improvement is possible.
Theorem 11 A (k, n) threshold scheme exists sharing
a classical secret of size s = p2 with one qupit (a p-
dimensional quantum state) per share whenever n ≤
2k − 2, p ≥ n, and p is prime.
Before giving the proof, I will review some basic facts
about quantum and classical error-correcting codes which
will be needed in the construction. A classical linear
[n, k, d] code encodes k bits in n bits and corrects d − 1
erasure errors. Classical codes must satisfy the Singleton
bound d ≤ n − k + 1. A code C where the bound is
met exactly is called an MDS code (for “maximum dis-
tance separable”), and has some interesting properties.
The dual C⊥ of C (composed of those words which have
vanishing inner product with all words of C) is also an
MDS code. When C is an [n, k, n − k + 1] code, C⊥ is
an [n, n− k, k+1] code. The codewords of the dual code
form the rows of the parity check matrix. By measuring
the parities specified by the parity check matrix, we can
detect errors — any parity which is nonzero signals an
error. In addition, in an MDS code, there is a codeword
with support exactly on the set T for any set T of size
d. See, for instance, chapter 11 of [17] for a discussion of
MDS codes.
Quantum codes can frequently be described in terms of
a stabilizer [18,19]. The stabilizer of a code is an Abelian
group consisting of those tensor products of Pauli ma-
trices which fix every quantum codeword. That is, the
codewords live in an eigenspace of all elements of the sta-
bilizer. If the stabilizer contains 2a elements, it is gen-
erated by just a elements, and if we have n qubits, the
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code encodes n − a qubits. We usually consider the +1
eigenspace of the stabilizer generators, but we could in-
stead associate an arbitrary sign to each generator. Ten-
sor products of Pauli matrices have eigenvalues ±1, so
each set of signs will specify a different coding subspace
of the same size.
Stabilizer codes can be easily generalized to work over
higher dimensional spaces [20]. We replace the regular
Pauli matrices with their analogs for p-dimensional states
X : |j〉 7→ |j + 1〉, Z : |j〉 7→ ωj |j〉, and powers and
products of X and Z (arithmetic is now modulo p, and
ω = exp(2pii/p)). The eigenvalues of X , Z and their
products and tensor products are powers of ω, so instead
of associating a sign with each generator of the stabilizer,
we should instead associate a power of ω.
There is a standard construction, known as the CSS
construction [21,22], which takes two binary classical
error-correcting codes and produces a quantum code.
This construction generalizes easily to qupits. Take the
parity check matrix of the first code C1 and replace j with
Xj, interpreting the rows as generators of the stabilizer.
Take the parity check matrix of the second code C2 and
replace j with Zj, again interpreting rows as generators
of the stabilizer. The stabilizer must be Abelian — this
produces a constraint on the two classical codes, namely
that C⊥2 ⊆ C1. If C1 is an [n, k1, d1] code and C2 is an
[n, k2, d2] code, the corresponding CSS code will be an
[[n, k1 + k2 − n,min{d1, d2}]] quantum code.
Now consider the classical polynomial code Dr whose
coordinates are (f(α1), . . . , f(αn)). α1, . . . , αn are n dis-
tinct elements of Zp (recall that p ≥ n), and f runs over
polynomials of degree up to r.3 There are r+1 coefficients
to specify f , so Dr encodes r+1 pits. Given the function
evaluated at r+1 locations, we can use polynomial inter-
polation to reconstruct the polynomial. In other words,
even if n− (r+1) coordinates of the code are missing, we
can reconstruct the r+1 coefficients specifying the poly-
nomial. Thus, this is an [n, r+1, n− r] classical code —
an MDS code. Also note that Dr ⊂ Dr+1.
The codes Dr provide good examples of purely clas-
sical secret sharing schemes [2]. If we choose the first
r coefficients of the polynomial at random, any set of
just r coordinates will contain no information about the
remaining coefficient, so we get an (r + 1, n) threshold
scheme. Applying the CSS construction to the codes Dr
and D⊥r−1 [23,24] similarly produces good examples of
quantum secret sharing schemes [4].
With this background, we are now ready to tackle the
construction.
Proof of Theorem 11: We will produce a class of secret
sharing schemes which use one qupit for each share and
3For an appropriate choice of the αis, Dr is a Reed-Solomon
code or an extended Reed-Solomon code.
encode two classical pits, whereas any purely classical
scheme could only encode one pit. We will use the clas-
sical codes Dr to create p
2 related CSS quantum codes
with certain useful properties. The secret sharing scheme
will encode the p2 classical states as the mixture of all
states in the corresponding code from this family.
Lemma: The parity check matrix for the code Dr−1 in-
cludes a row R such that for any set of r+1 coordinates,
there is a linear combination of rows of Dr−1 with sup-
port exactly on that set of coordinates. R appears in the
linear combination with coefficient 1. Similarly, the dual
code D⊥s has, in its parity check matrix, a row S which
appears with coefficient 1 in a linear combination with
support on any given set of n− s coordinates.
For instance, we can take n = 4, r = 2, s = 1, p = 5.
D1 has generator matrix
G =
(
1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3
)
(7)
(generated by polynomials 1 and x), and D⊥1 has gener-
ator matrix
G′ =
(
2 4 1 3
3 0 1 1
)
. (8)
(The parity check matrix of D1 is the generator matrix
of D⊥1 and vice-versa.) By subtracting j times the first
row of G from the second row of G, we get a vector with
support on the three-element set excluding coordinate j.
Similarly, by adding some multiple of the first row of G′
to the second row of G′, we can get a vector with support
on any three coordinates.
Proof of Lemma: The codes Dr and D
⊥
s are linear,
so we only need prove the coefficients of rows R and S
are nonzero — then some rescaling will always give the
result with coefficient 1.
Since Dr is an MDS code of distance n− r, its dual is
an MDS code of distance r + 2. Thus, the parity check
matrix of Dr (which is also the generator matrix of D
⊥
r )
has a linear combination of rows with support on any set
of r + 2 coordinates, but no linear combination of rows
has weight r+1 or less. Since Dr−1 is included in Dr, but
encodes one fewer pit, the parity check matrix of Dr−1 is
just the parity check matrix of Dr with one row R added.
That parity check matrix has a linear combination of
rows with support on any set of r+1 coordinates. Since
no linear combination of rows ofD⊥r has weight r+1, each
of the weight r + 1 linear combinations must include a
component of row R. A similar argument gives the result
for D⊥s . ✷
Now suppose we create the CSS code corresponding to
the two classical codes Dr−1 and D
⊥
s . We require that
s = n − r − 1, 2r ≥ n. Then s < r, so Ds ⊆ Dr−1, and
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we have a quantum code. We are given two classical pits
a and b to share among n parties. Assign a phase ωa to
the generator R corresponding to row R of Dr−1 and a
phase ωb to the generator S corresponding to row S of
D⊥s . All the other generators have phase +1. Create the
density matrix formed by a uniform mixture over states
in the subspace specified by this stabilizer. There are p2
of these mixed states.
Claim: The set of mixed states described above define
a (k, n) threshold scheme encoding 2 classical pits, with
k = r + 1 = n− s.
For instance, in the case n = 4, r = 2, s = 1, p = 5,
we get the stabilizers
X2 X4 X X3
ωa X3 I X X
Z Z Z Z
ωb I Z Z2 Z3
(9)
with ω = exp(2pii/5). The claim is that this gives a (3, 4)
secret sharing scheme.
I now proceed to establish the claim, which will prove
Theorem 11.
For any set T of k coordinates, there will be an el-
ement MR of the stabilizer with support on that set of
coordinates, whereM contains no factors of R or S. This
follows from the lemma: There is a linear combination
M + R of rows of the parity check matrix of Dr−1 with
support on T . This linear combination translates to an
element of the stabilizer — the rows of the parity check
matrix become generators of the stabilizer, addition of
two rows becomes multiplication of the corresponding
generators, and scalar multiplication of a row becomes
taking the corresponding generator to the appropriate
power.
SinceMR has support on T , we can measure its eigen-
value with access only to T . M is a product of generators
which are not R or S, so the state has eigenvalue +1 for
M , and it has eigenvalue ωa for MR. Thus, the eigen-
value ofMR tells us a. Similarly, there is an element NS
of the stabilizer with support on T , with N having no fac-
tors of R or S. We can measure the eigenvalue of NS,
and it tells us b. Thus, any set of at least k coordinates
is an authorized set.
A particular value of the secret is encoded as a uniform
distribution over states in the stabilizer code described
above. Thus, the density matrix corresponding to the
secret is the projection on the subspace which is left fixed
by the stabilizer. That is,
ρ(ab) =
∏
i
(I +Mi +M
2
i + . . .+M
p−1
i ) (10)
=
∑
M∈S
M (11)
(normalized appropriately). The Mi are the generators
of the stabilizer S. Assume the appropriate phase is in-
cluded in M in this sum (this means that if we wish M
to have eigenvalue ω, we include it as ω−1M , which has
eigenvalue +1).
Suppose T is a set of k − 1 or fewer coordinates. The
density matrix of T is the trace of ρ(ab) over the com-
plement of T . Now, X , Z, and all nontrivial products of
X and Z have trace 0. Thus, the only terms in the ex-
pression for ρ(ab) which contribute to the trace are those
coming fromM with weight≤ k−1. But the parity check
matrices for Dr−1 and D
⊥
s contain no rows or linear com-
bination of rows of weight less than k. Thus, the density
matrix of T is just the identity, regardless of the value of
ab. Thus, T is unauthorized, proving the theorem. ✷
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